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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Mark Clayton Boman appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to traffic in heroin, claiming 
(1) the district court erred by excluding his alibi witness as a sanction for a 
discovery violation, and (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 
argument, although he did not object to the prosecutor's arguments at trial. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On January 20, 2010, Detective Clay Christensen with the Boise Police 
Department received a call from postal inspector Rodd Herr indicating the post 
office had a package he suspected contained a controlled substance. (Tr.1, 
p.175, Ls.6-16.) That same day an individual came to the post office inquiring 
about the package. (Tr., p.177, Ls.4-10.) That individual left a phone number 
and one of the post office employees also obtained his license plate number. 
(Tr., p.178, Ls.19-21, p.179, Ls.15-19, p.361, L.8-p.365, L.16.) 
The following day, Detective Christensen opened the suspicious package 
and confirmed it contained a controlled substance, specifically, heroin. (Tr., 
p.181, Ls.3-22.) As part of the investigation, Detective Robert Berrier conducted 
surveillance on the residence to which the package was addressed - 222 
Jackson Street, Apartment L. (Tr., p.261, Ls.7-15.) Detective Berrier began his 
1 There are four transcripts included in the record on appeal. The only transcript 
referred to in the Respondent's Brief is the trial transcript, which will be referred 
to as "Tr." 
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surveillance at "[a]pproximately eight in the morning" on January 21, 2010. (Tr., 
p.261, Ls.7-18.) Prior to conducting his surveillance, Detective Berrier was 
provided a photograph of the individual who inquired about the package the 
previous day. (Tr., p.261, Ls.19-23.) The individual depicted in the photograph 
was identified as Boman. (Tr., p.262, Ls.7-9.) 
During his surveillance of 222 Jackson, Apartment L, on January 21, 
2010, Detective Berrier saw Boman "pulling in" at around 3:00 p.m. in a truck 
matching the description of the truck driven by the individual who inquired about 
the package at the post office on January 20, 2010. (Tr., p.262, L.20 - p.263, 
L.7.) Boman entered Apartment L, staying less than five minutes before leaving 
and going back to the post office where he was seen the previous day. (Tr., 
p.263, Ls.8-13, p.264, Ls.9-19.) At the post office, Boman retrieved the package 
containing heroin and left, driving back in the direction of 222 Jackson Street. 
(Tr., p.190, L.3 - p.191, L.6.) Officer Lance Nickerson was subsequently 
directed to initiate a traffic stop on Boman, which he did. (Tr., p.502, Ls.5-15.) 
Detective Christensen also participated in the traffic stop during which the heroin 
was seized and Boman was arrested. (Tr., p.503, L.3 - p.504, L.3, p.190, L.21 -
p.192, L.10.) When asked about the package containing heroin, Boman said he 
picked it up for Jesse Duran. (Tr., p.196, Ls.16-20.) Boman also stated "he was 
a daily user of heroin" and said he had used heroin "that morning about 8 a.m." 
(Tr., p.197, Ls.2-7.) 
Detective Berrier continued his surveillance of 222 Jackson after Boman 
left to retrieve the package from the post office. (Tr., p.264, Ls.14-23.) At around 
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4:00 p.m., Detective Berrier "observed two individuals, a male and female, exit 
out of Apartment L and begin walking across the apartment parking lot." (Tr., 
p.264, L.24 - p.265, L.3.) Detective Berrier made contact with those individuals 
who identified themselves as Vicki Ornelas and Jesse Duran. (Tr., p.265, Ls.4-
9.) In response to Detective Berrier's questions, Duran admitted he had heroin in 
his pocket and drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.267, Ls.12-22.) Detective Berrier also 
learned that Ornelas had $600 in her bra and a syringe. (Tr., p.268, Ls.1-5.) A 
subsequent search of 222 Jackson, Apartment L uncovered numerous additional 
syringes. (Tr., p.268, Ls.6-18.) Duran and Ornelas were also arrested. (Tr., 
p.270, Ls.12-15.) 
The state charged Boman with conspiracy to traffic in heroin (R., pp.7-9, 
20-22, 34-36.) The state also charged Ornelas and Duran with the same offense 
and the three cases were consolidated for trial. (R., pp.12-13.) On April 28, 
2010, the state filed a discovery request, which included a request that Boman 
"furnish the State with a list of names and addresses of witnesses the defendant 
intends to call at trial." (R., pp.54-55.) That same request asked Boman to 
disclose, within ten days, in writing and "[p]ursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519 
... any specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at 
the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses 
upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi." (R., pp.55-56.) Despite 
the state's specific requests, Boman did not disclose an alleged alibi witness until 
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just prior to trial. 2 (Tr., p.275, Ls.6-15.) Counsel for Boman explained the late 
disclosure was due to the fact that the "name was not disclosed to [him] until 
quite recently" and that he was told that the witness "was not going to be able to 
testify until ... his parole got revoked," which apparently occurred just prior to 
Boman's trial. (Tr., p.275, L.24 - p.276, L.3; see also p.276, Ls.13-16.) Counsel 
further represented that the witness, Herbert Hoyt, would testify that Boman was 
in Salt Lake on January 20 and, therefore, could not have been at the post office 
in Boise on that same date inquiring about the package containing heroin.3 (Tr., 
p.276, Ls.7-11, p.277, L.23 - p.278, L.3; p.586, L.25 - p.587, L.2.) The state 
moved to exclude Hoyt as a witness (Tr., p.275, Ls.17-19), and the court 
reserved ruling until Hoyt could be transported to allow the state an opportunity to 
talk to him (Tr., p.280, Ls.7-15). 
Although the state had the opportunity to speak with Hoyt after he was 
transported, Hoyt was "[n]ot cooperative." (Tr., p.583, Ls.21-25.) Moreover, the 
state advised the court that, as a result of the late disclosure, it was unable to 
"corroborate[]" or "invalidate[]" Hoyt's and Boman's claims regarding Boman's 
whereabouts on January 20. (Tr., p.584, Ls.6-23.) The court granted the state's 
motion to exclude Hoyt as a witness, concluding the disclosure was untimely and 
2 Boman refers to the timing of his disclosure as "several days before trial 
started" (Appellant's Brief, p.12 (emphasis omitted)), however, this 
characterization is misleading given that the disclosure did not occur until the 
Friday before the trial began on Monday. 
3 During the discussion of what the alibi witness would allegedly say, Boman 
represented to the court that he was in Utah "[a]II day on the 20th" and returned 
on the 21st. (Tr., p.279, Ls.22-24.) 
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the state did "not have the ability ... to investigate to determine the reliability of 
what the witness would testify to." (Tr., p.586, Ls.6-23; p.587, Ls.5-7.) 
Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Boman guilty 
of the charged offense - conspiracy to traffic in heroin. (R., pp.173-174.) The 
district court imposed a unified 25-year sentence with 15 years fixed. (R., 
pp.184-185.) Boman timely appealed. (R., pp.187-190.) 
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ISSUES 
Boman states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it excluded Mr. 
Boman's alibi witness as a sanction for a discovery violation? 
2. Were Mr. Boman's constitutional rights to due process and a fair 
trial violated by the State's unobjected-to misconduct in closing 
arguments? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Boman failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
excluding the testimony of an alibi witness who was not disclosed until what was 
effectively the day before trial, which deprived the state of the ability to 
investigate the alleged alibi? 
2. Has Boman failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the 
prosecutor's closing arguments to which he did not object? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Boman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Excluding The Testimony Of An Alibi Witness Who Was Not Disclosed Until The 
Friday Before Boman's Trial Started On Monday 
A. Introduction 
On the Friday prior to his trial that started on Monday, Boman disclosed 
Hoyt as an alibi witness who would allegedly testify that Boman was in Utah on 
January 20 during the time postal employees testified he was seen at the post 
office attempting to pick up a package containing heroin. The court granted the 
state's motion to exclude such testimony noting the late disclosure and the 
state's inability to investigate the witness's claim. 
Boman argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 
excluding Hoyt's testimony, contending the court "failed to balance any prejudice 
asserted by the State against [his] right to a fair trial, and failed to consider lesser 
sanctions before resorting to exclusion." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Boman has 
failed to show any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to show 
from the record either that the district court abused its discretion or that he was 
actually prejudiced by the exclusion of Hoyt's testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal, this Court reviews the record to determine if the finding of a 
discovery violation is supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. 
Stradle'(, 127 Idaho 203, 207-208, 899 P.2d 416, 420-421 (1995). However, 
"[w]hether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of an 
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appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court." State v. 
Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State 
v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). See also State 
v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). "[T]he trial court's 
exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it 
has been clearly abused." State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416, 
421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495,496 (1977)). 
In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court 
considers (1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent 
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised 
reason in reaching its decision. State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 456, 988 P .2d 
680, 682 (1999) (citation omitted). 
C. Boman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Excluding Hoyt's Testimony 
Idaho Code§ 19-519 states, in relevant part: 
(1) At any time after arraignment before a magistrate upon a 
complaint and upon written demand of the prosecuting attorney, the 
defendant shall serve, within ten (10) days or at such different time 
as the court may direct, upon the prosecuting attorney, a written 
notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the 
defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the 
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense 
and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he 
intends to rely to establish such alibi. 
(4) Upon the failure of either party to comply with the 
requirements of this section, the court may exclude the testimony of 
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any undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendant's 
absence from or presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This 
section shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify in his own 
behalf. 
(5) For good cause shown the court may grant an exception 
to any of the requirements of subsections (1) through (4) of this 
section. 
Not only did Boman fail to disclose Hoyt as an alibi witness as required by 
I.C. § 19-519, a fact which he admits (Appellant's Brief, p.8), there is no 
indication in the record that he disclosed the fact of an alibi at all (see generally 
R.), which is also required by I.C. § 19-519(1 ). Nevertheless, Boman claims 
excluding Hoyt as a witness was improper because, he asserts, the district court 
"failed to balance any prejudice asserted by the State against [his] right to a fair 
trial, and failed to consider lesser sanctions before resorting to exclusion." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) In support of this argument, Boman first suggests that 
the state had the burden of requesting "a postponement of trial" or "additional 
time during which to investigate and prepare to rebut the anticipated testimony of 
the alibi witness" before requesting exclusion. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
According to Boman, the state instead "sandbagg[ed]" him by not "rais[ing] the 
issue" until the second day of trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) These 
arguments lack merit. 
Boman has failed to cite any authority that stands for the proposition that 
the state has an obligation to request a continuance before requesting exclusion, 
and the state is aware of none. Rather, if there was any burden beyond the 
disclosure requirement itself, it was Boman's burden to show good cause why he 
should be excused from the requirements governing alibis and alibi witnesses. 
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I.C. § 19-519(5); cf. Stradley, 127 Idaho at 209, 899 P.2d at 422 (rejecting 
argument that state has a duty to mitigate late disclosure by a defendant). 
Furthermore, while Boman claims he is "aware of the irony" of his argument that 
the state was "sandbagging" (Appellant's Brief, p.13 n.3), he is apparently 
unaware of what that word actually means. There is nothing in the record that 
would support any claim that the state delayed raising the issue to the court to 
gain some tactical advantage, nor is there any evidence that the state did not 
attempt to contact Hoyt once Boman disclosed his name. To the contrary, the 
prosecutor advised the court at the outset of trial on day two, which was a 
Tuesday, that Boman had just disclosed an alibi witness the previous Friday and 
that he sent his investigator to interview Hoyt that day. (Tr., p.275, Ls.6-15; 
p.279, Ls.3-6.) Boman fails to explain precisely how the timing of the state's 
notice to the court or its immediate response to the information constituted 
sandbagging, he just boldly asserts that it does. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) If 
Boman thought the issue needed to be presented to the court sooner to avoid 
any unfair advantage to the state, perhaps he should have raised it. 
Boman also argues that the district court erred in excluding Hoyt because 
it "never considered less severe sanctions" and "never weighed any prejudice 
that the State would suffer against [his] right to a fair trial." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.13.) When deciding whether to exclude a defense witness as a sanction for a 
discovery violation, the trial court must "balance the prejudice to the State due to 
the lateness of disclosure against the defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. 
Martinez, 137 Idaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. 
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Miller, 133 Idaho 454,457, 988 P.2d 680, 683 (1999}; State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 
843, 846-47, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (1999}; State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 
633-34, 945 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1997}). The court must also consider "less severe 
remedies ... that might serve as an alternative to excluding the evidence." State 
v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. 
Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 303, 923 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Ct. App. 1996); Harris, 132 
Idaho at 846, 979 P.2d at 1204). Contrary to Boman's argument on appeal, 
application of these principles to the facts of this case shows the district court 
properly exercised its discretion in excluding Hoyt's testimony as a sanction for 
Boman's failure to disclose him as a witness before trial. 
Although the court did not expressly consider "less severe sanctions" or 
specifically articulate that it weighed the prejudice to the state against Boman's 
right to a fair trial, it does not necessarily follow that the court did neither. See 
State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) ("The implicit 
findings of the trial court, (i.e., that statements of the defendant made to the 
police were voluntary and should not be suppressed) should be overturned only if 
not supported by substantial evidence."}; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 
961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court 
supported by substantial evidence should be given due deference."). In fact, the 
court discussed the prejudice when the state first raised the issue, and asked trial 
counsel: 
... So what does this do to the State's case? How do you check 
this guy out? I mean that's the problem that the State has is how 
do they check on the information to disprove what he says about 
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being in Utah because were there other people there that saw Mr. 
Boman there or what do they do? What do they do now? 
(Tr., p.276, L.25 - p.277, L.7.) 
Counsel responded that he understood the concern and represented to 
the court that Boman did not tell counsel the name "until very recently" because 
Hoyt would not be "willing and able to testify" unless and until his parole was 
revoked. (Tr., p.276, Ls.11-16; p.279, Ls.8-17.) In fact, counsel advised the 
court that it was not necessarily his advice to call Hoyt as a witness, but Boman 
was "quite eager to have him testify that he was in Salt Lake on the 20th of 
January." (Tr., p.277, L.24 - p.278, L.3.) The court indicated it did not know if it 
would allow Boman to call Hoyt as a witness and advised it would make its 
decision after the prosecutor had an opportunity to interview him. (Tr., p.278, 
Ls.21-24.) At that point, the prosecutor informed the court that the state's 
investigator talked to Hoyt Friday afternoon after his name was disclosed, but the 
state could not "corroborate" or "invalidate anything [Hoyt] [was] going to say 
because of late disclosure." (Tr., p.279, Ls.3-7.) The court recognized, "[t]hat's 
the problem." (Tr., p.279, L.13; see also L.18.) 
After Hoyt was transported from jail and the prosecutor had the 
opportunity to try and speak to him, the court addressed the matter again. The 
prosecutor explained: 
Judge, I had an opportunity last night to speak with [Hoyt]. 
Not cooperative with the State, I would say that. He was quite 
upset having been here all day long and missing out on CAP 
program and training. 
So I had an investigator have a chance to speak with him 
Friday afternoon. Obviously, I had a chance last night at 6:30 after 
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we got out of court to try and go talk with him. Again, the main 
issue the State has with this, Judge, is he's providing information 
that could be corroborated or may -- could be invalidated, but the 
State doesn't have an opportunity to do so. 
For example, he says he was stopped by police down in 
Rupert. I am sure there is some type of a dispatch call that an 
officer went out on saying he was stopping a vehicle. I can't 
confirm that. He says that they got gas at a gas station in 
Snowville, Utah. Again, there would be audio of that, video of that, 
excuse me. I can't confirm that either. He says that there was a 
witness that came and took the package and he knows that 
witness's name, but he won't give me that witness's last name or 
his address. There is just a lot of things that I can't corroborate with 
that witness. 
(Tr., p.583, L.23 - p.584, L.23.) 
After the prosecutor expressed his concerns regarding the prejudice to the 
state due to the late disclosure, defense counsel, in response to the court's 
questions, stated his investigator had actually interviewed Hoyt "the middle of 
July," but they "had some questions about whether [they] wanted to call Mr. Hoyt 
at all." (Tr., p.585, Ls.13-19.) Trial counsel then stated he discussed the matter 
with Boman on July 23 (two weeks before Hoyt was disclosed) and Boman 
confirmed "he did want to talk to him" but counsel "still took that back and 
discussed the matter," and "ultimately [only] revealed [Hoyt] when Mr. Boman 
was fairly insistent" that he do so. (Tr., p.585, Ls.13-24.) Counsel also advised 
the court that he had "filed a Freedom of Information Act request to the Rupert 
police department requesting that they divulge any information on a traffic stop of 
Mr. Hoyt's van on the 21 5\" but had not received a response (Tr., p.585, L.25 -
p.586, L.5), which was consistent with the state's position that it was not given 
adequate time to investigate Hoyt's claims. The court responded: 
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All right. Looks like [counsel] and -- did his due diligence, 
but the problem is, though, the State does not have the ability then 
to investigate to determine reliability of what the witness would 
testify to. 
Under 19-519, it appears from the filing, the request for 
discovery was filed April 28th and an alibi witness would have then 
had to have been provided to the State looks like no later than May 
8th. . . . [A]nd this trial wasn't scheduled until August. So there 
was plenty of time to -- it appears Mr. Boman would have had 
plenty of time to notify his attorney about the alibi witness and bring 
it to the attention of the Court sooner than this coming up the first 
day of trial. This is the first time I knew about it [The prosecutor] 
apparently found out about it the Friday before. 
Okay. So pursuant to 19-519, it appears that it is untimely 
noticed and so Hebert Hoyt will not be allowed to testify. 
(Tr., p.586, L.6 - p.587, L.7.) 
Although the district court did not explicitly indicate it weighed the 
prejudice against the state against Boman's right to a fair trial, the court's 
comments clearly indicate an awareness and consideration of the prejudice to 
the state resulting from the untimely disclosure, not only of the alibi witness but 
the alibi itself, and the limited ability to investigate that alleged alibi. 
Boman's assertion that the prejudice analysis also required the state to 
explain the specific actions it had taken to investigate the alibi before asking for 
exclusion is unsupported by any authority and the law does not appear to require 
such. Miller is instructive on this point. In Miller, the trial court excluded the 
testimony of a witness who was attempting to provide "expert" testimony because 
the witness was not timely disclosed. 133 Idaho at 456, 988 P.2d at 682. In 
doing so, the court stated: 
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Frankly, I can see where it would be advantageous to have 
that testimony. But on the other side of the coin, fair is fair. I just 
don't think you can spring an expert with that sort of testimony. On 
the other side, I don't care whose side it is, without giving the 
chance to at least meet it. And they're not given that chance. 
[Objection] [s]ustained. 
Miller, 133 Idaho at 457, 988 P.2d at 683. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, reasoning the trial 
court "considered the defense's right to a fair trial and weighed the prejudice to 
the State, he decided to exclude the witness' testimony on the basis that the 
State had not prepared to meet undisclosed expert testimony." Miller, 133 Idaho 
at 457, 988 P.2d at 457. In reaching this conclusion, nowhere did the Court 
suggest that, before a trial court could exclude the witness, the state was 
required to detail what actions the state had or could take to rebut the testimony. 
Rather, the only requirement is that the state "make a showing that it would [be] 
prejudiced if the defense witness ... testified." ~ (citing Lamphere, 130 Idaho 
at 634, 945 P.2d at 5). The state made the requisite showing in this case. 
The record also supports the conclusion that the prejudice to the state 
outweighed Boman's right to a fair trial. While Boman undoubtedly has the right 
to present a defense, that right is not unfettered, and exclusion may be an 
appropriate remedy for failing to comply with pre-trial disclosure deadlines. 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-411 (1988); State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 
62 P.3d 208 (Ct. App. 2002). Indeed, Boman's arguments regarding the 
importance of Hoyt to his right to a fair trial are severely undermined by the fact 
that he allowed this right to be governed by Hoyt's willingness to testify only if his 
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parole was revoked. Nor does Boman explain why he could not disclose the fact 
of an alibi even if he would not disclose the name of his alibi witness until his alibi 
agreed to testify. Boman's acquiescence in Hoyt's conditional willingness to 
testify weighs in favor of exclusion. As explained by the United States Supreme 
Court in Taylor: 
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate 
and appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they 
would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there 
are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the 
prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process. One 
of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk 
that fabricated testimony will be believed. Defendants who are 
willing to fabricate a defense may also be willing to fabricate 
excuses for failing to comply with a discovery requirement. The risk 
of a contempt violation may seem trivial to a defendant facing the 
threat of imprisonment for a term of years. A dishonest client can 
mislead an honest attorney, and there are occasions when an 
attorney assumes that the duty of loyalty to the client outweighs 
elementary obligations to the court. 
We presume that evidence that is not discovered until after 
the trial is over would not have affected the outcome. It is equally 
reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a 
defense witness who is not identified until after the 1 fh hour has 
passed. 
484 U.S. at 413-414 (footnote omitted). 
Thus, while, as Boman argues, less drastic sanctions are always 
available, this does not mean the trial court is required to pursue a remedy other 
than exclusion, particularly under circumstances such as those present in 
Boman's case.4 See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413-414. "Given the ease with which 
4 Contrary to Boman's assertion on appeal, exclusion is not limited to "extreme 
cases, mainly those involving defense misconduct." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
Taylor, the case upon which Boman relies for that assertion, does not support 
such a broad rule. Rather, while Taylor involved defense misconduct, the Court 
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an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an 
eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate." Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 81 (1970). Boman intentionally withheld the fact of an alibi from the 
state and waited to disclose his alibi witness until after that witness decided he 
would be willing to testify because his parole was revoked, and even then, the 
witness was not disclosed until Boman became insistent that he testify. This 
tactic, in conjunction with the suspect validity of Hoyt's testimony in that it was 
predicated on revocation of his parole, Hoyt's lack of cooperation in being 
interviewed by the state, and the state's inability to corroborate or invalidate 
Hoyt's claims in the midst of trial, support the district court's conclusion that 
exclusion was a proper remedy. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-415 ("The integrity 
of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable 
evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and 
efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-
specifically said it was "neither necessary nor appropriate ... to attempt to draft a 
comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every 
possible case." 484 U.S. at 414. In fact, the only reference in Taylor that 
supports a claim that exclusion is limited to "extreme cases" is in a footnote 
where the Court indicates that "in Illinois, the sanction of preclusion is reserved 
for only the most extreme cases." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417 n.23 (emphasis 
added). The Court never adopts this view. If anything, Taylor simply supports 
the proposition that defense misconduct can elevate a case beyond the normal 
weighing that would occur and allows exclusion even if the prejudice to the state 
is minimal and other lesser sanctions are available. ~ at 417 ("Regardless of 
whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided in this particular 
case, it is plain that the case fits into the category of willful misconduct in which 
the severest sanction is appropriate."); see Albert, 138 Idaho at 287, 62 P.3d at 
211 (where "discovery violation was willful and designed to facilitate the 
presentation of fabricated testimony or to impede the State's ability to conduct 
effective cross-examination or to present rebuttal evidence," "untimely-disclosed 
defense evidence may be excluded notwithstanding the availability of other 
sanctions that would prevent prejudice to the State") (citations omitted). 
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determining function of the trial process must also weigh in the balance."). 
Boman has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
D. Even If Error, The Exclusion Of Hoyt's Testimony Was Harmless 
'"Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test is whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have 
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207,209,804 P.2d 
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991 )). The district court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding Hoyt's testimony. However, even if error, the exclusion of the 
testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable probability under the 
facts of this case that the exclusion contributed to Boman's conviction. 
Although Boman's presence at the post office on January 20 was a 
component of the state's case against him, it was not necessary to his conviction 
because it was among several other acts alleged by the state in support of the 
conspiracy charge. (See R., pp.156-157.) The jury was instructed that it was 
only required to find that only one of the parties to the conspiracy (Boman, 
Duran, or Ornelas) "performed at least one of the following acts": 
a. On or between the 1st day of January, 2010, and the 21st 
day of January, 2010, Jesse E. Duran contacted a heroin source in 
California and ordered the heroin and/or 
b. On or between the 1st day of January2, 201 0,and the 21st 
day of January, 2010, Jesse E. Duran and/or Vicki Ornelas and/or 
Mark Boman provided funds to pay for the heroin and/or 
c. On or between the 1st day of January, 2010, and the 21st 
day of January, 2010, Jesse Duran wired and/or sent funds to 
heroin source in California and/or 
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d. On the 20th day of January, 2010, Mark Boman and Vicki 
Ornelas contacted the U.S. Post Office in order to ascertain the 
location of the package of heroin and/or take custody of the 
package of heroin, and/or 
e. On the 20th day of January, 2010, Mark Boman provided a 
contact number to the U.S. Post Office for notification of arrival of 
the package of heroin and/or 
f. On the 21st day of January, 2010, Jesse E. Duran directed 
Mark Boman to pick up heroin, and/or 
g. On the 21st day of January, 2010, Mark Boman picked up 
the heroin from the U.S. Post Office and/or 
h. On the 21st day of January, 2010, Mark Boman was in 
possession of the heroin and transported it in order to deliver the 
heroin to Jesse E. Duran and/or Vicki Ornelas. 
(R., pp.156-157 .) 
Because Boman's presence in Idaho on January 20 was only included in 
two of the eight over acts alleged and because the jury could convict Boman 
based on a finding that the parties to agreement engaged in the other six acts, of 
which there was substantial evidence, even if the jury believed testimony from 
Hoyt that Boman was in Utah on January 20, the exclusion of Hoyt's testimony, if 
error, was harmless. 
More likely, however, is that the jury would have rejected Hoyt's testimony 
altogether given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that Boman was 
actually at the post office on January 20. Amy Farnham, a post office employee, 
testified that on January 20, 2010, Boman came to inquire about the package. 
(Tr., p.360, L.14 - p.362, L.18; p.365, L.20 - p.366, L.14.) Farnham gave a 
detailed description of the person who came to the post office that date and 
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positively identified Boman as that person at trial. (Id.) On January 20, Farnham 
also got a description of the truck being driven by the individual who came to 
inquire about the package, including the license plate. (Tr., p.364, L.19 - p.365, 
L.16.) Further investigation revealed that truck was registered to Boman. (Tr., 
p.311, L.4 - p.312, L.12; p.496, L.11 - p.500, L.8.) Farnham also testified that 
the same individual who came to the post office on January 20 to inquire about 
the package, returned on January 21 to retrieve the package, and was driving the 
same truck. (Tr., p.367, L.4 - p.368, L.19.) 
Another postal employee, John Stinchcomb, confirmed Farnham's 
testimony in that he was the individual who actually handed the package to 
Boman on January 21. (Tr., p.390, L.3 - p.392, L.4.) Surveillance of Boman on 
January 21 corroborated Farnham's and Stinchcomb's testimony, as did the fact 
that Boman was driving the truck identified by Farnham and was in possession of 
the package when he was arrested. (Tr., p.188, L.6-p.192, L.21; p.214, L.11 -
p.216, L.6; p.261, L.7- p.264, L.20; p.286, L.21 - p.289, L.21.) 
Ornelas also confirmed Boman's involvement in the heroin conspiracy. 
Ornelas testified that when she moved here from California in November 2009 to 
live with Duran (at 222 Jackson Street), Boman and Duran were working 
together. (Tr., p.429, Ls.4-25; p.431, Ls.18-21.) Ornelas and Duran also relied 
on Boman for rides. (Tr., p.440, L.24 - p.441, L.9.) In December 2009, Boman 
would come over for short visits with Duran and talk about drugs and obtaining 
money to buy drugs. (Tr., p.441, L.12 - p.442, L.4.) In particular, Boman and 
Duran discussed splitting the cost of a "piece" of heroin, which is approximately 
20 
24 grams. (Tr., p.442, L.23 - p.443, L.10.) According to Ornelas, this occurred 
approximately once per week, and this testimony was consistent with the 
testimony of William Gans, a post office employee, who testified that similar 
express mail packages were sent to 222 Jackson Street on January 8, January 
15, and January 20, 2010. (Tr., p.321, L.8 - p.322, L.7; p.325, L.11 - p.326, L.7; 
p.327, Ls.5-15; p.445, Ls.12-18; p.447, Ls.16-18.) Ornelas testified that Duran 
would order the heroin from California and it would be shipped by mail. (Tr., 
p.446, L.17 - p.447, L.11.) Ornelas received the package at least twice. (Tr., 
p.447, Ls.19-25.) 
Ornelas further testified that she saw Boman and Duran with the heroin, 
"cutting it up" and "[p]utting it in baggies." (Tr., p.448, Ls.8-16.) In fact, on one 
occasion Ornelas got angry with Boman for cutting the heroin with sugar. (Tr., 
p.458, Ls.19-25.) Duran then sold the heroin in grams and half grams. (Tr., 
p.462, L.19 - p.464, L.21.) 
With respect to what occurred on January 20, Ornelas testified that Duran 
called Boman "to see if he could get [them] some heroin" because they did not 
have any and they were "sick." (Tr., p.468, L.14 - p.469, L.9.) Boman indicated 
that he wanted to "go in on it." (Tr., p.474, Ls.1-20.) 
Ornelas also testified that on January 21, Boman called Duran and said 
the post office called him and told him the package was available for him to pick 
up. (Tr., p.470, L.2 p.471, L.2.) Boman subsequently came to the apartment 
where Duran and Ornelas lived and gave them "a couple grams." (Tr., p.471, 
Ls.15-20.) Boman then left to go pick up the package from the post office. (Tr., 
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p.472, L.24 - p.473, L.14.) After Boman left, Ornelas and Duran also left the 
apartment at which time they were contacted by law enforcement and arrested. 
(Tr., p.475, L.23 - p.476, L.4.) Boman's actions on January 21, as recounted by 
Ornelas, were consistent with the testimony of the surveillance officers. 
The evidence at trial overwhelmingly pointed to Boman's guilt. Given the 
weight of the evidence, any error in the exclusion of Hoyt's testimony could not 
reasonably have affected the outcome of the case and was therefore harmless. 
Boman has failed to show any basis for reversal. 
11. 
Boman Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Boman claims two statements included in the prosecutor's closing 
remarks, which were not objected to, were misconduct amounting to fundamental 
error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-17.) Specifically, Boman claims the prosecutor 
committed misconduct during closing argument by allegedly shifting the burden 
of proof and "misrepresent[ingJ the evidence.'' (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Review 
of these claims shows no fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time 
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on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. Id. at 980. 
C. Boman Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
Boman contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 
argument by "misrepresent[ing]" evidence when he stated, in closing argument, 
that Boman "forged" Duran's signature when he picked up the heroin package 
and by highlighting the absence of any evidence that Boman was "somewhere 
else," thereby taking advantage of successfully excluding evidence of Boman's 
alleged alibi. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Perry, unobjected to 
claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d 978. 
Application of the foregoing standard to Boman's claims of unpreserved 
error demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled 
to reversal of his conviction. 
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1. Alleged Misrepresentation Of Evidence Was Not Fundamental Error 
In discussing the elements of the lesser included offense of possession of 
heroin, the prosecutor stated, without objection: 
And did he intend to possess it? A person has 
possession of something if he knows of its presence, has physical 
control of it and/or has the power and intention to control it. Mark 
Boman intended to possess both the baggie that he gave to Jesse 
Duran and Vicki Ornelas as well as the package. Why? Because 
had he (sic] physical control, physical control of both of those items. 
They were in his seat. He signed for it. He forged (Duran's] 
signature to get that package. He intended to control that package. 
(Tr., p.667, Ls.14-25.) 
Boman argues that the reference to Boman "forg(ing]" Duran's signature 
was an improper misrepresentation of the evidence because "postal employee 
John Stinchcomb, testified ... that, in his experience, it was 'not out of the 
ordinary' for someone to sign the addressee's name when retrieving a package 
for another person" and because "under Idaho law, (forgery] requires the 'intent 
to defraud."' (Appellant's Brief, p.15 (citing Tr., p.390, L.3 - p.393, L.14).) 
Boman also complains that the reference violated I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's 
Brief, p.16.) Boman's arguments fail to satisfy the first prong of Perry. 
It is clear from the context of the prosecutor's argument that he was 
merely trying to establish that by picking up the heroin package, and signing 
Duran's name, Boman had the intent to possess the package and the heroin 
contained therein. While use of the word "forged" may not have been accurate in 
terms of whether the crime of forgery was committed, that was not what the state 
was attempting to demonstrate and characterizing the prosecutor's use of the 
word "forged" as a misrepresentation of the evidence is only true in a technical 
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sense divorced from the facts of the case. In context, the prosecutor's use of the 
word "forged" did not violate any of Boman's constitutional rights. Further, with 
respect to Boman's 404(b) argument, any claimed violation of that rule would not 
qualify as constitutional error. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _, 254 P.3d 77, 
83-84 (Ct. App. 2011) (concluding "the requirements set forth in I.RE. 404(b), 
regarding admissibility and notice, are not of constitutional import" and noting 
prior cases rejecting claims that evidentiary error rises to the level of fundamental 
error). 
Even if Boman could satisfy the first prong of Perry, his argument fails on 
the second and third prongs. Indeed, Boman makes no attempt to explain why 
the alleged error is clear or obvious and does not require additional information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision. With respect to 
whether the error was harmless, Boman argues the evidence was not harmless 
because, according to him, "[c]ommon sense dictates that wrongly accusing [him] 
of committing a separate crime related to picking up the package would make it 
more likely that a jury would believe that [he] was a person of bad character with 
a propensity to commit crimes." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) To suggest, as 
Boman's argument does, that the comment that Boman "forged" Duran's 
signature, made in relation to the prosecutor's argument regarding the elements 
of the lesser included offense of possession on which Boman was not convicted, 
tipped the scales and convinced the jury that he was guilty of the great offense of 
trafficking in heroin, ignores the record and falls far short of demonstrating the 
word "forged" affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
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Boman has failed to show inclusion of the word "forged" in the 
prosecutor's closing argument qualifies as fundamental error entitling him to 
reversal of his conviction. 
2. The Prosecutor's Comment Regarding The Lack Of Evidence That 
Boman Was Somewhere Else Was Not Fundamental Error 
Boman argues that the prosecutor also committed misconduct when, in 
closing argument, and without objection, he stated "Have you heard any 
evidence that Mark Boman was anywhere else?" (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The 
statement was made in the following context during the prosecutor's discussion 
of the evidence proving the acts alleged in the conspiracy: 
The other thing that's on D [in element 6 of Instruction No. 11 ), is 
that Mark Boman and Vicki Ornelas contacted the Post Office in 
order to ascertain the location of the package. Has that been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt? Have you heard any evidence 
that Mark Boman was anywhere else? 
How would, how would Amy Farnham, a postal worker, who 
doesn't know Tom from Joe be able to get a license plate who the 
registered owner is Mark Boman who is friends with Jesse Duran 
who happened to be into a heroin agreement out of the blue? How 
does that happen? 
I submit it doesn't happen. It's not a conspiracy by postal 
workers to frame [Boman) on that day. That's not it. [Boman) was 
there. He was present. They identified him. They got his license 
plate and they got a phone number. 
(Tr., p.661, L.18 - p.662, L.9.) 
While it would have been advisable for the prosecutor to avoid 
commenting on the absence of evidence that Boman was "anywhere else," 
compare State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (1991) 
(improper to argue victim's chastity after getting evidence of sexual history 
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excluded, but error harmless), instead of just focusing on the evidence of his 
presence, that passing reference hardly demonstrates a violation of any of 
Boman's constitutional rights, much less behavior that was so egregious that this 
Court should accept Boman's invitation to send "a message . . . that such 
behavior will not be tolerated" (Appellant's Brief, p.17). See Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) ("[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.") (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) 
("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."). 
Further, even if constitutional error, Boman has failed to establish either 
that the error was clear or obvious and the lack of objection was not the result of 
a tactical decision or that the result of the trial would have been different absent 
the comment. Indeed, while Boman wanted to introduce an alibi for his 
whereabouts on January 20, his attorney was clearly reluctant to do so, instead 
focusing on what occurred on January 21 and arguing that Boman did not know 
what was contained in the package because, regardless of whether Boman could 
have (or should have been able to) produce evidence of an alibi on January 20, it 
could not be disputed that he was found in possession of the heroin on January 
21. (See Tr., p.671, Ls.7-24.) For this reason, and the reasons set forth above 
regarding the strength of the evidence implicating him in the conspiracy to traffic 
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heroin, any error related to the prosecutor's comment in closing argument about 
the absence of any evidence that Boman was anywhere else was harmless. 
Because Boman has failed to show fundamental error with respect to any 
of his unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct, he has failed to show 
any basis for review of those claims, much less grounds for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Boman's judgment of 
conviction for conspiracy to traffic in heroin. 
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